Slack resources, firm performance, and the institutional context: Evidence from privately held European firms by Vanacker, T et al.
SLACK RESOURCES, FIRM PERFORMANCE AND THE INSTITUTIONAL 
CONTEXT: EVIDENCE FROM PRIVATELY HELD EUROPEAN FIRMS 
 
 
 
Tom Vanacker 
Ghent University 
 Faculty of Economics and Business Administration 
Sint-Pietersplein 7, 9000 Gent, BELGIUM 
TomR.Vanacker@UGent.be  
 
 
Veroniek Collewaert  
Vlerick Business School, Area Entrepreneurship, Governance and Strategy 
Katholieke Universiteit Leuven, Department of Managerial Economics, Strategy and Innovation 
Reep 1, 9000 Gent, BELGIUM 
veroniek.collewaert@vlerick.com  
 
 
Shaker A. Zahra 
Carlson School of Management 
University of Minnesota, 
321 19th Avenue South, Minneapolis, MN 55455, USA 
zahra004@umn.edu  
 
 
Running head: Slack Resources, Performance and the Institutional Context 
 
 
Keywords: Slack resources; performance; creditor rights; employee rights; private firms 
 
 
Citation for the published version: Vanacker, T., Collewaert, V., & Zahra, S. A. (2017). Slack 
resources, firm performance, and the institutional context: Evidence from privately held 
European firms. Strategic Management Journal, 38(6), 1305-1326. 
 
1 
 
SLACK RESOURCES, FIRM PERFORMANCE AND THE INSTITUTIONAL 
CONTEXT: EVIDENCE FROM PRIVATELY HELD EUROPEAN FIRMS 
 
 
ABSTRACT 
Research summary: Integrating the behavioral and institutional perspectives, we propose that a 
country’s formal institutions, particularly its legal frameworks, affect managers’ deployment of 
slack resources. Specifically, we explore the moderating effects of creditor and employee rights 
on the performance effects of slack. Using longitudinal data from 162,633 European private 
firms in 26 countries, we find that financial slack enhances firm performance at diminishing rates 
whereas human resource (HR) slack lowers performance at diminishing rates. However, 
financial slack has a more positive effect on firm performance in countries with weaker creditor 
rights whereas HR slack has a more negative effect on performance in countries with stronger 
employee rights. The results provide a richer view of the relationship between slack and firm 
performance than currently assumed in the literature. 
 
Managerial summary: A key dilemma managers often encounter is whether, on the one hand, 
they should build in excess resources to buffer their firms from internal and external shocks and 
to pursue new opportunities or whether, on the other hand, they should develop “lean” firms. 
Our study suggests that excess cash resources—which are usually viewed as easy to redeploy—
benefit firm performance, especially when firms operate in countries with weaker creditor rights. 
However, excess human resources—which are usually viewed as more difficult to redeploy—
hamper firm performance, particularly when firms operate in countries with stronger labor 
protection laws. Thus, the management of slack resources critically depends on the 
characteristics of these resources (e.g., redeployability) and the institutional context in which 
managers operate. 
 
INTRODUCTION 
Slack—the pool of resources in an organization that is in excess of the minimum necessary to 
sustain routine operations—is a central concept in a behavioral theory of the firm (Argote and 
Greve, 2007; Bromiley, 2005; Cyert and March, 1963). How managers use slack and slack‘s 
performance effects have long been debated in the strategy literature (e.g., Bourgeois, 1981; 
Bradley et al., 2011a, b, c; Bromiley, 1991; George, 2005; Kim and Bettis, 2014; Lecuona and 
Reitzig, 2014; Mousa and Reed, 2013; Natividad, 2013; Tan and Peng, 2003; Wiseman and 
Bromiley, 1996). Managers can use slack to stabilize their firms‘ core activities and foster 
strategic behavior that creates value (Cyert and March, 1963; Thompson, 1967). Alternatively, 
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managers can also use slack for inefficient and value-destroying purposes (Jensen and Meckling, 
1976; Leibenstein, 1966; Williamson, 1963). Empirical research has been similarly equivocal 
about the performance effects of slack, even when considering the existence of distinct types of 
slack resources (e.g., unabsorbed versus absorbed) and their differential redeployability. 
Prior conflicting findings may stem from researchers‘ lack of attention to the environment 
in which managers allocate and use slack resources. Yet, as Gavetti et al. (2012: 24) note, ―the 
environmental influence on [managers‘] goals appears to be stronger now than when Cyert and 
March (1963) was written‖. Conceptually, this environment is broader than the firm‘s industry. It 
also includes for instance the cultural, economic, legal and political institutions that influence 
how managers make decisions on the deployment and use of resources (North, 1990). Most prior 
studies, however, have examined individual countries, without examining their institutional 
environments, which are crucial to explaining managerial behavior (Meyer and Rowan, 1977; 
Oliver, 1991). Likewise, existing research has ignored cross-country differences that impinge on 
managers‘ motivation and discretion as they allocate and use resources (e.g., Crossland and 
Hambrick, 2011; Wu and Tihanyi, 2013). However, legal frameworks in particular vary 
significantly across countries in the extent to which they protect different stakeholders, placing 
limits on managers‘ discretion in allocating and using their firms‘ resources as they attempt to 
meet the expectations of their stakeholders (Schneper and Guillén, 2004). These differences 
suggest a need to empirically examine the effect of variations in the institutional environment on 
managers‘ use of slack resources and the performance effects of these resources across countries.  
To this end, we integrate the behavioral perspective (e.g., Cyert and March, 1963) with 
the neo-institutional perspective (e.g., DiMaggio and Powell, 1983; Meyer and Rowan, 1977). 
The behavioral perspective focuses on the allocation of slack within firms. It suggests that slack 
plays a positive stabilizing and adaptive function and thus contributes to firm performance, 
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although too much slack also has its costs and can lower performance (Bromiley, 2005). 
Examining whether and how stakeholders‘ powers, as enshrined in national laws, moderate the 
slack-performance relationship allows us to determine the efficacy of institutional theory in 
explaining differences found in this relationship for firms operating in different countries.
1
 Thus, 
we propose and test the argument that the relationship between a firm‘s slack resources and its 
performance is moderated by country-level institutions. This focus recognizes the need to 
consider the firm‘s broader external environment when studying slack resources, as suggested in 
the literature (Bradley et al., 2011b; George, 2005; Lecuona and Reitzig, 2014). Still, this 
literature has tended to equate a firm‘s external environment with its industry (see Capron and 
Guillén, 2009; Crossland and Hambrick, 2007, for a similar observation in the broader strategy 
literature), ignoring the broader institutional setting which provides the framework that managers 
use in making resource allocation decisions. 
We focus on the performance effects of financial and HR slack in privately held firms. 
Though prior empirical studies have primarily focused on the performance effects of financial 
slack (e.g., Bradley et al., 2011b; George, 2005), it is important to test a behavioral perspective 
on a broader set of slack resources—including those slack resources (such as HR slack) that have 
been less rigorously investigated—to determine its generalizability. A priori, the differential 
performance effects of distinct slack resources are unclear (Tan and Peng, 2003). However, 
behavioral theorists have noted that ―slack should not be considered in a generic sense‖ 
(Wiseman and Bromiley, 1996: 539). Indeed, financial resources are managed differently from 
human resources. For instance, these resources are different in terms of their divisibility and 
fungibility and hence their stickiness (Mishina et al., 2004). Such differences could affect the 
                                                          
1
 The absolute level of a given resource a firm has could depend on the national institutional framework in which it 
operates. However, we look at slack resources available in a firm adjusted for industry and country norms. This 
implies that the level of slack is not dependent on the country-level institutions or any country-level variable. 
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ability of managers to (re)deploy these resources (Bourgeois and Singh, 1983; Wang et al., 
2016). In addition, different national institutions are more (or less) likely to affect managers‘ 
(re)deployment of distinct types of slack resources. Overall, these complexities suggest a need to 
examine the effects of distinct types of slack resources and the power of distinct stakeholders, 
who provide the firm with these critical resources. 
Privately held firms offer an interesting setting in which to investigate an integrated 
behavioral and institutional perspective on the slack-performance relationship. Theoretically, the 
allocation and deployment of slack resources are likely to dominate managerial decision making 
in privately held firms (George, 2005). Moreover, focusing on private firms allows for a cleaner 
identification of the relevant external environments and stakeholder protection laws. Indeed, 
managers in large, geographically diversified, public firms are likely to be confronted more with 
―diverse, nonmonolithic, fragmented, and possibly conflicting sets of external environments‖ 
relative to the generally small and medium sized, private firms we study (Kostova et al., 2008: 
997). In addition, not all stakeholders and stakeholder protection laws are equally relevant for 
public and private firms. For instance, the shareholder laws that are relevant for public firms 
differ from those that are relevant for private firms (Bebchuk and Hamdani, 2009). More 
significantly, private firms are often unable or unwilling to raise new equity financing, making 
external shareholders less critical and creditors more critical stakeholders (Brav, 2009). 
Practically, private firms are the dominant organizational form across the globe (Faccio et al., 
2011; George, 2005). For instance, even in the UK—a market based financial system—private 
firms represent 97.5% of all incorporated entities (Brav, 2009). 
 We use a dataset comprising 604,462 firm-year observations, which represent 162,633 
European privately held firms. This sample is substantially larger and broader than those 
employed in prior studies in terms of industries (56 industries), macroeconomic conditions 
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(periods of economic growth and decline) and countries (26 countries) covered. Our sample is 
particularly suitable to investigate an integrated behavioral-institutional perspective on the slack-
performance relationship. First, the broad legal institutions that exist around the globe today 
originated in Europe. To date, significant variability remains in the legal institutions across 
European countries despite their geographical proximity and membership in common institutions 
such as the European Union (EU) (although not all the countries we study are EU member states). 
Second, private firms follow the same accounting standards as public firms in Europe, providing 
us with a large-scale dataset with high-quality data on private firms (Faccio et al., 2011). 
Our paper contributes to the slack literature by adopting an integrated behavioral-
institutional perspective aiming to bring ―order‖ to the mixed evidence reported in previous 
research on the performance effects of slack resources (e.g., Daniel et al., 2004). Testing our 
integrated theory on a multi-country sample allows us to provide a robust assessment of the 
external validity of prior results, an important concern in the strategy literature (Bettis et al., 
2016). It also forms the starting point for a broader contribution. We respond to calls for more 
research on the effects of institutions on fundamental managerial decisions (such as resource 
allocation) and firm outcomes (e.g., Gavetti et al. 2012; Greenwood et al., 2008). We do so by 
focusing on the effects of national legal institutions that protect creditors‘ and employees‘ 
interests on the slack-performance relationship in private firms. Overall, our study clarifies a key 
source of conflicting findings in the nature of the slack-performance relationship while allowing a 
rigorous test of the generalizability of past findings (Tsang and Kwan, 1999). 
 
SLACK RESOURCES AND FIRM PERFORMANCE 
Slack resources form a continuum, ranging from unabsorbed to absorbed slack (Singh, 1986). 
Unabsorbed slack consists of those resources which are currently uncommitted and are readily 
6 
 
available for redeployment within firms (Bourgeois and Singh, 1983). Cash resources represent 
the most easily redeployable resources and therefore managers have the greatest discretion in 
allocating them to alternative uses (George, 2005; Greve, 2003). Absorbed slack consists of those 
resources that are already tied to current operations, but may be recovered, with more managerial 
effort and time. Examples are HR, accounts receivables and overhead expenses (Bourgeois and 
Singh, 1983; Greve, 2003; Voss et al., 2008). We focus on unabsorbed financial slack and 
absorbed HR slack to capture both opposing ends of the continuum. Both types of slack also refer 
to resources that are critical for any firm and have been studied in prior research (e.g., Bradley et 
al., 2011b; Lecuona and Reitzig, 2014; Mishina et al., 2004; Mousa and Reed, 2013; Paeleman 
and Vanacker, 2015; Vanacker et al., 2013; Voss et al., 2008), albeit with conflicting results.  
 The allocation and deployment of slack resources are likely to dominate managerial 
decision making in privately held firms (George, 2005). Typically, these firms lack access to—
and are often unwilling to access—external capital markets (Brav, 2009). Consequently, though 
managers in public firms can smooth their activities and invest when appropriate and hence often 
do not stockpile cash in response to an improvement in performance, private firms often stockpile 
cash whenever they have an opportunity to do so (Brav, 2009). Small and medium sized private 
firms are also usually constrained in their access to the labor market. They frequently face more 
difficulties when recruiting employees because they are often unknown and lack legitimacy as an 
employer-of-choice compared to larger, public firms (Williamson, 2000). Creating a buffer of 
human resources may then be a central concern for managers of privately held firms which may 
find it more difficult to hire employees on demand (e.g., Welbourne et al., 1999).  
Strategy researchers, however, observe that having resources alone does not make much 
difference for firm performance, but how managers allocate and deploy resources has a great 
impact on firm performance (Penrose, 1959). Recent work indeed shows that how managers 
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orchestrate the use of resources can make a significant difference in managers‘ strategic choices 
and firm performance (Sirmon et al., 2007). As such, this literature highlights the critical role that 
managers play in managing and deploying resources in pursuit of their firms‘ goals.  
In the behavioral theory of the firm, slack should mainly positively affect firm 
performance as it plays ―both a stabilizing and adaptive role‖ (Cyert and March, 1963: 38) by 
providing managers with the necessary resources to tackle many organizational challenges. 
Indeed, slack plays a stabilizing role in several ways (Bourgeois, 1981). It enables managers to 
induce key stakeholders (e.g., employees, suppliers) to stick with the organization by allowing 
―payments to members of the coalition in excess of what is required to maintain the organization‖ 
(Cyert and March, 1963: 36). Without slack there is significantly less leeway to, for instance, 
provide key employees perquisites (e.g., extra financial incentives and slack time) to keep them 
tied to the organization. When key stakeholders cease their relationships with the organization, 
such disruptions can adversely impact firm performance. Campbell et al. (2012), for instance, 
show that in knowledge intensive settings, employee mobility negatively influences firm 
performance, particularly when former employees create new ventures rather than join 
established firms. Moreover, such exits often result in the loss of valuable knowledge. Managers 
can valuably use slack resources to avoid such relationships being ended prematurely. 
Slack also enables managers to reduce potentially dysfunctional conflicts that arise 
between organizational subunits because of competition over scarce resources (Pondy, 1967). 
Given bounded rationality, complex organizations function by splitting work into subunits or 
groups which focus on smaller, more manageable problems (Bromiley, 2005). Subunits, 
however, face different organizational problems, perceive the same problems differently and may 
have different and even conflicting goals (Cyert and March, 1963). With sufficient slack, 
managers can satisfy divergent subunit goals without subunits turning into contending factions. 
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Moreover, for those problems that do arise, slack allows for those problems to be aired and 
solved more easily; indeed, with sufficient slack managers can come up with ―a solution for 
every problem‖ (Moch and Pondy, 1977: 356).  
Managers may also employ slack to buffer the technical core of the organization from 
disruptions arising from competition over resources (Bromiley, 1991; Cyert and March, 1963; 
Thompson, 1967). Without any slack or ―internal shock absorbers‖ built into their workflow 
(Bourgeois, 1981: 30), organizations will experience breakdowns in their routine operations, even 
with the smallest possible internal disruption. Thus, slack buffers interdependent organizational 
units, which, in a boundedly rational world, cannot perfectly coordinate their activities 
(Bourgeois, 1981). Without HR slack, for instance, the unexpected illness of an employee will 
make it impossible for an organizational unit to provide basic services and will eventually cause 
delivery delays to other units and customers. Slack resources further protect organizations from 
external pressures or environmental shocks. Wan and Yiu (2009), for example, show that slack 
resources contributed more to firm performance during the Asian Economic Crisis—an 
environmental jolt that suddenly and unexpectedly increased environmental uncertainty. 
 Slack resources also play an adaptive role as a facilitator of strategic behavior in 
organizations, fostering innovation and experimentation (Bourgeois, 1981). They allow 
organizations to more safely experiment with highly uncertain (but potentially lucrative) projects, 
fostering ―a culture of experimentation‖ (Nohria and Gulati, 1996: 1247). Slack further enables 
slack search; i.e., it allows managers to explore projects which have strong support from 
scientists or other corporate champions, but which would not have been approved in the face of 
resource scarcity (Cyert and March, 1963; Greve, 2003; Nohria and Gulati, 1996).
2
 Consistent 
                                                          
2
 Another key concept in the behavioral theory of the firm is problemistic search (Cyert and March, 1963) or search 
that is triggered by managers ―when organizational performance is below their aspiration level‖ (Greve, 2003: 687). 
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with these ideas, O‘Brien (2003) shows that slack helps firms to sustain their competitive position 
by providing the resources needed for continuous investments in R&D and new product launch.  
However, while slack ―serves a positive function‖, a behavioral perspective also 
recognizes that ―maintaining slack costs money so too much slack can lower profitability‖ 
(Bromiley, 2005: 31). Building on the idea coined by Cyert and March (1963) that conflicts over 
budgets are less intense and managers are less stringent when slack is abundant, Nohria and 
Gulati (1996) further argue that too much slack diminishes discipline over innovative projects. 
Finally, managers who control too much slack may become complacent and feel overly 
optimistic and as a consequence become less likely to experiment or take strategic actions (Kim 
et al., 2008). Indeed, Debruyne et al. (2010) show that the presence of more resources leads 
decision makers to believe they are able to react effectively to competitive attacks, but also 
makes them less motivated to do so. 
 Overall, organizations are expected to have a desirable level of slack, where too little 
slack creates many organizational problems and too much slack is equally untenable (Bourgeois, 
1981; Sharfman et al., 1988). In a similar vein, Bromiley (2005: 31) states ―just as individuals 
have some desirable level of fat, organizations can have too little or too much slack‖. Thus,3 
Hypothesis 1a: The relationship between financial slack and firm performance takes the 
form of a quadratic function with a positive linear term and a negative squared term. 
                                                                                                                                                                                            
A lack of support for the innovation-in-the-face-of-adversity hypothesis, however, prompted Cyert and March (1963) 
to propose that slack, rather than ‗necessity‘, fosters innovation (e.g., Bourgeois, 1981; O‘Brien, 2003). Problemistic 
search and slack search have ―distinct and separable effects‖ (Greve, 2003: 688). Indeed, Greve (2003) argues that 
slack and performance do not necessarily co-vary much and that performance (adjusted by aspiration levels) is more 
subjective, short-term and volatile than slack. Moreover, contrary to slack search which facilitates bold strategic 
behaviors, problemistic search is expected to be local (Bromiley, 2005). Prior research also suggests that 
problemistic search in declining organizations contributes to a further decline in performance (Wiseman and 
Bromiley, 1996). Our focus is on the relationship between slack and firm performance, but as we describe later, we 
do empirically control for past firm performance and industry performance, as performance aspirations generally 
come from one‘s own performance and the performance of similar others (Bromiley, 2005). 
3
 These quadratic relationships are often referred to in the literature as inverted U-shaped (e.g., Nohria and Gulati, 
1996; Tan and Peng, 2003). However, following Kim and Bettis (2014) we use the term ―quadratic relationship‖ 
since ―inverted U-shaped‖ implies that the peak lies within the valid range of the dataset, which is not always true 
and remains subject to empirical scrutiny. 
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Hypothesis 1b: The relationship between HR slack and firm performance takes the form 
of a quadratic function with a positive linear term and a negative squared term. 
 
SLACK RESOURCES, FIRM PERFORMANCE AND THE INSTITUTIONAL 
CONTEXT 
Even though there has been a vast amount of research examining the direct relationship between 
slack resources and firm performance, more recently scholars have begun to examine the 
conditions under which this relationship is strongest (e.g., Argote and Greve, 2007; Vanacker et 
al., 2013). Researchers have paid special attention to the role of a firm‘s external environment. 
For instance, some prior research has shown that financial slack is most beneficial to firm 
performance in hostile and stable industries (Bradley et al., 2011b), but becomes harmful in more 
complex industries (George, 2005). In their study of Mexican manufacturing plants, Lecuona and 
Reitzig (2014) have also shown that tacit and specific HR slack becomes almost twice as valuable 
when plants face more intense competition. 
Equating the external environment with a firm‘s industry, most prior studies have adopted 
a single-country research design, overlooking that different countries have distinct institutional 
contexts.
4
 Managers operating in these different contexts, however, have different preferences 
and abilities in allocating slack resources, calling for incorporating the institutional environment 
in analyses seeking to clarify the effects of slack resources on firm performance. National 
institutions are among the most important forces that can influence this relationship by limiting 
managers‘ discretion in making resource allocation decisions. We focus on the role of legal 
institutions, or the ―regulative‖ institutional pillar (Scott, 1995). These institutions are powerful in 
                                                          
4
 Some studies have focused on a sample comprising firms from a very limited set of countries (for instance, the U.S. 
and Canada (Singh, 1986) or Hong Kong and Singapore (Wan and Yiu, 2009)). However, these studies also 
overlooked the fact that countries have different institutional contexts, and these studies were constrained in 
examining such issues because of the small sample of firms in each country and the limited number of countries 
being investigated. 
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their influence on managers‘ strategic choices and as a result influence firm performance 
(Aguilera and Jackson, 2003; Aguilera et al., 2013; Oliver, 1991). Institutional theorists believe 
that this influence occurs through managers‘ voluntary compliance with the legal frameworks 
that society maintains or through coercion. Either way, managers‘ choices have to account for 
such legal frameworks to retain legitimacy (North, 1990; Scott, 1995). 
Invoking an institutional perspective, we propose that the performance effects of slack 
resources depend on the characteristics of the national corporate governance systems regulating 
managerial behavior. Specifically, we examine the moderating effect of the degree of protection 
of creditors and employees on the slack-performance relationship. We focus on creditor and 
employee rights because these two groups of stakeholders have relatively direct claims on a 
private firm‘s resources. Moreover, these two groups have been extensively studied (Botero et 
al., 2004; La Porta et al., 1997), especially in the strategy literature (Capron and Guillén, 2009; 
Schneper and Guillén, 2004). In the following section, we theorize on how creditor rights are 
likely to influence the performance effects of financial slack. This is followed by a discussion on 
how labor protection laws are likely to influence the performance effects of HR slack. 
 
Creditor rights and the performance consequences of financial slack 
Creditor rights refer to the legal rights of creditors against defaulting debtors. When these rights 
are strong, creditors have more power to force repayment, seize collateral assets, and/or gain 
control over the firm (Djankov et al., 2007). The degree to which laws protect creditors varies 
considerably across countries (La Porta et al., 1997). In some countries, creditor rights mandate 
management dismissal in case of bankruptcy or reorganization whereas in other countries they do 
not. Also, before deciding whether a firm should be liquidated or not, in some countries an 
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automatic stay gives managers some time to communicate with their creditors. Yet, this option 
does not exist in other countries.  
Stronger creditor rights lead to deeper and more developed private debt markets (e.g., 
Djankov et al., 2007; 2008; Haselmann et al., 2010; La Porta et al., 1997). Indeed, Djankov et al. 
(2007, p. 315) found that as the creditor rights index rises by one, the private credit to gross 
domestic product (GDP) ratio rises by six percentage points. Moreover, stronger creditor 
protection makes credit available on more favorable terms, such as lower interest rates (e.g., Bae 
and Goyal, 2009). Together, these observations suggest that weaker creditor rights decrease the 
availability of debt financing in the firm‘s environment and increase the cost of raising debt 
financing from its environment.  
When managers face constraints in gaining access to debt financing from their 
environment because of weaker creditor rights, the positive stabilizing function of financial slack 
may prove especially valuable. One probable reason is that, in such resource-constrained 
environments, without financial slack any unexpected reduction in cash flow will result in an 
immediate shortage of internal funds causing, for instance, layoffs, difficulties in paying 
employees or suppliers and the cancelation (or delay) of basic capital investments, leading to 
internal turmoil (e.g., Bromiley, 1991). When managers face constraints in gaining access to debt 
financing because of weaker creditor rights, this may also heighten the value of financial slack‘s 
adaptive role. Indeed, with fewer external financial alternatives, managers of firms with little 
financial slack may not be able to experiment with new strategic initiatives or pursue new 
business opportunities. Having an internal buffer of cash resources that could be rapidly 
deployed—despite the existence of finance constraints in the environment—may thus both 
alleviate the potential risk of underinvestment and restore a firm‘s strategic flexibility (e.g., 
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Bradley et al., 2011b; Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978). These changes should make the value of 
financial slack higher (lower) for firms in countries with weaker (stronger) creditor rights.  
In addition, one of the key benefits of financial slack is its adaptive role, including 
fostering innovation, experimentation and risk-taking activities that would improve firm 
performance (Bromiley, 1991; Kim et al., 2008). Stronger creditor rights, however, may reduce 
managers‘ willingness to use financial slack to pursue such activities. In fact, some research 
shows that stronger creditor rights are associated with reduced risk-taking, leading to lower R&D 
intensity and innovation (Acharya et al., 2011; Seifert and Gonenc, 2012). Serving as a risk-
taking disincentive, strong creditor rights can reduce the impact of entrepreneurial activities firms 
undertake (Cumming et al., 2014). These findings suggest potentially harmful effects of stronger 
creditor rights with respect to innovation and risky investments. Overall, stronger creditor rights 
may limit both the stabilizing and adaptive function of financial slack, reducing its value. Thus, 
 Hypothesis 2: The impact of financial slack on firm performance will be less positive 
(more negative) for firms located in countries with stronger creditor rights, relative to firms 
located in countries with weaker creditor rights. 
 
Labor protection laws and the performance consequences of HR slack 
Labor protection laws, which aim to protect employees from exploitative employers, also differ 
considerably across countries. For instance, significant differences exist across countries in terms 
of the power that unions have, the costs associated with firing employees and the ease with which 
managers can do so, and the social insurance provided against unemployment and sickness 
(Botero et al., 2004). Yet, only recently have strategy scholars begun to examine the effect of 
national corporate governance institutions related to stakeholder groups other than suppliers of 
finance, recognizing that these other stakeholders (e.g., employees)—and the powers of these 
stakeholders as enshrined in national laws—can also have an influence on managers‘ decision-
making and discretion. Capron and Guillén (2009), for instance, have shown that stronger 
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protection of employee rights in the target country significantly restricts an acquirer‘s ability to 
restructure the target and to redeploy resources. Van Essen et al. (2013) have also found that 
stronger labor rights protections constrain the ability of blockholders to pursue value-enhancing 
strategies such as adjusting their scale of operations when faced with revenue shocks.  
Labor economists have long argued that labor protection laws introduce considerable 
adjustment costs such that managers operating in countries with stricter regulations will be slower 
to adjust to shocks. Consequently, stronger employee rights may restrict firm-level firing and 
hiring decisions such that managers will be less inclined to make firing decisions when 
confronted with negative shocks, but also less likely to hire when confronted with positive shocks 
(Caballero et al., 2013)—with the former effect being stronger than the latter (Banker et al., 
2013). For instance, Adhvaryu et al. (2013) show that the changes in agricultural laborer 
employment in India in response to high versus low rainfall are greater in those states with less 
restrictive labor regulation. Overall, these findings show that stricter labor regulations reduce 
managers‘ flexibility when dealing with human resources.  
When managers face stricter labor protection laws and the resulting reduced flexibility 
those laws impose, the stabilizing and adaptive roles of HR slack may be hampered. Previous 
research has indicated that HR slack is ―stickier‖ than financial slack and is therefore more 
difficult to reallocate in the short term (Mishina et al., 2004; Voss et al., 2008). Whereas those 
human resources acquired in the past may fit with the direction of the firm‘s expansion currently 
being pursued, they likely constrain the pursuit of opportunities in areas that require different 
skills. Further, their stickiness implies that human resources are more difficult to redeploy. This 
may explain why Lecuona and Reitzig (2014) find that HR slack is only valuable when the 
employees needed to address unforeseen events cannot be hired and trained ad hoc—if they could 
be, hiring them on the spot as such events arise may be a better alternative than holding onto HR 
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slack that managers cannot deploy as effectively as new employees hired for specific jobs. 
Combined with the inherent sticky nature of HR slack, stricter labor protection laws hence likely 
make it even harder to redirect any given buffer of human resources towards solving specific 
internal problems or pursuing new, value-creating opportunities.  
Indeed, HR slack is likely to be less ―sticky‖ and therefore easier to redeploy for firms 
located in countries with weaker labor protection laws. For instance, in these environments, 
managers who have built up a buffer of excess manpower have more freedom in redeploying 
those human resources in response to sudden external pressures or internal shocks (i.e., HR 
slack‘s stabilizing role). Weaker labor protection laws also enhance HR slack‘s adaptive role 
because managers have more flexibility in changing their firms‘ buffer of human resources if 
they pursue new opportunities that require different skill sets. They also have more power to 
change the conditions of a particular job with existing employees, fire redundant employees, and 
hire employees with different skills. In contrast, managers in countries with stronger labor 
protection laws are more constrained in redeploying and reshaping their ―buffer‖ of human 
resources. Once HR slack has been built in, it is difficult and more costly to change the 
composition of the human resource base when situations or opportunities pursued change 
radically. While managers could resort to training and development to make people more suitable 
for the new roles, sources of formal training—and the necessary funding—are more restricted for 
small and medium sized, private firms (Cardon and Stevens, 2004). Stronger employee rights are 
hence expected to hamper both the stabilizing and adaptive function of HR slack, reducing its 
value. Thus, 
Hypothesis 3: The impact of HR slack on firm performance will be less positive (more 
negative) for firms located in countries with stronger employee rights, relative to firms located in 
countries with weaker employee rights. 
 
METHOD 
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Data 
Focusing on privately held European companies, firm-level data for this study come from 
Amadeus. The Amadeus database is compiled by Bureau van Dijk (BvD), one of Europe‘s 
leading electronic publishers of business information, and includes comparable financial 
information for firms from both Western and Eastern European countries. Disclosure 
requirements in Europe require private firms to publish annual accounting information.
5
 BvD 
collects accounting information from a variety of sources, such as official registers and regulatory 
bodies (e.g., National Bank in Belgium, The Federal Statistics Service in Russia, Chamber of 
Commerce in the Netherlands and Italy and Companies House in the U.K.), annual reports, 
private correspondence, firm websites and news reports. BvD further harmonizes the financial 
accounts to allow accurate cross-country comparisons. Prior research shows that the data of 
private firms in Amadeus is as reliable as the data from alternative sources, such as OneSource 
(Faccio et al., 2011). The coverage of European firms in Amadeus, however, is unrivaled by other 
databases. 
We first selected private firms with available financial accounts between 2006 and 2009 
(we also collected 2005 data to calculate the lagged variables for the initial year of our study). 
Our time frame covers periods of economic growth, the global financial crisis of 2008 and 
subsequent periods of economic decline. Second, we excluded utility companies because they are 
usually heavily regulated and largely state-owned. We further excluded financial services firms, 
the government/public sector and education (mainly public sector in Europe) because regulatory 
issues often drive business decisions in these industries. Third, we require firms to report basic 
                                                          
5
 However, disclosure requirements and the amount and type of information vary among countries. For instance, 
small firms in the U.K. are not required to submit a profit and loss statement. The completeness of the data also 
varies among countries. For instance, in Germany failure to disclose financial accounts is not a punishable offence 
for small and medium-sized enterprises. 
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accounting data (e.g., total assets, employment, sales, and gross profit). This criterion excludes 
―empty shells‖—i.e., firms only established for tax purposes (Klapper et al., 2006). Finally, we 
eliminate firms with less than 20 employees. Given that this cut-off point is above that of any 
reporting nation, it helps to provide more comparable samples across countries (Desai et al., 
2003). These four criteria result in an unbalanced panel of 625,708 firm-year observations, which 
represent 167,959 firms from 34 countries operating in 56 two-digit NACE industries.  
Country-level data, including creditor and labor protection measures, come from a variety 
of sources, including published work by Botero et al. (2004) and Djankov et al. (2007) and 
statistics from the World Bank. We exclude Bosnia, Cyprus, Estonia, Iceland, Liechtenstein, 
Malta, Montenegro and Serbia because of the lack of basic country-level control variables or 
creditor and labor protection measures for these countries. This results in a final unbalanced panel 
of 604,462 firm-year observations, representing 162,633 firms from 26 countries operating in 56 
two-digit NACE industries. Table 1 presents detailed sample summary statistics by country. 
*** Include Table 1 about here *** 
Measures 
To minimize concerns of reverse causality, we measure the dependent variable at time t and the 
independent and control variables at t-1. By doing so, we also account for the fact that managers 
may need time to ―unlock‖ slack resources to convert them into new activities that will affect 
firm performance. Some prior studies have argued and shown that managers can do this within 
one year (e.g., Daniel et al., 2004: 572), which is in line with our applied one-year time lag. To 
avoid that data errors and outliers unduly influence our results, we truncated all ratio variables 
described below at the 0.5% tails (e.g., Brav, 2009).
6
  
                                                          
6
 Winsorizing the data at the 0.5% tails provides almost identical results. 
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Dependent variable. We measure firm financial performance as gross profit on total 
assets. Gross profit is defined as revenue minus the cost of making a product or providing a 
service before deducting overhead, payroll, tax, and interest payments (e.g., George, 2005). We 
scale gross profit by total assets to make performance comparable across firms of different size 
and to mitigate heteroskedasticity concerns (Brav, 2009). This measure is not influenced by 
differences in tax rates across countries or by differences in financial structures across firms. 
Moreover, as gross profit is measured before deducting payroll payments, we avoid capturing 
simple constructed correlations (or accounting identities). Indeed, alternative performance 
measures, such as return on assets (ROA), may suffer from the fact that slack resources—and 
particularly HR slack—may be already built into the cost structure of firms. More specifically, 
payroll expenses constitute a cost that will automatically count against income, lowering 
operating profit, and thus ROA, in the short run. Using gross profit on total assets instead 
circumvents this potential problem.
7
  
Independent variables. Consistent with prior research, we use financial ratios to 
calculate slack (e.g., Bradley et al., 2011b; Bromiley, 1991; George, 2005; Greenley and 
Oktemgil, 1998; Greve, 2003; Kim and Bettis, 2014; Paeleman and Vanacker, 2015; Mishina et 
al., 2004; Wan and Yiu, 2009).  
To test Hypothesis 1a and Hypothesis 2, we measure Financial slack as cash and cash 
equivalents scaled by total assets (Kim and Bettis, 2014; Vanacker et al., 2013). This measure is 
adjusted by subtracting the mean ratio of cash and cash equivalents to total assets for all firms 
operating in the same 4-digit industry and country as the focal firm (Bromiley, 1991). As such, it 
represents a close estimate of excess cash resources firms hold compared to industry and country 
                                                          
7
 Nevertheless, we also used ROA, defined as earnings before interest and taxes (EBIT) on total assets, as a 
performance measure and obtained qualitatively similar results. 
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norms. Given the hypothesized quadratic relationship between financial slack and performance, 
we calculate financial slack squared to capture such potential quadratic effects. The inclusion of 
squared terms also provides theoretical consistency with previous work (e.g., Bradley et al., 
2011b; Bromiley, 1991) and addresses econometric concerns related to Type I and Type II errors 
when examining interactive hypotheses without including squared terms (e.g., Ganzach, 1997). 
To test Hypothesis 1b and Hypothesis 3, we measure HR slack as the number of 
employees (measured in full-time equivalents) scaled by total sales (Mellahi and Wilkinson, 
2010; Mishina et al., 2004; Welbourne et al., 1999). We adjusted this measure by subtracting the 
mean ratio of employees to sales for all firms operating in the same 4-digit industry and country 
as the focal firm. When firms employ more people to generate a specific amount of sales, relative 
to their peers, they are expected to have more HR slack (hence, larger values indicate greater 
levels of HR slack).
8
 Again, consistent with our hypothesized quadratic relationship between HR 
slack and performance, we calculate HR slack squared to capture such potential quadratic effects. 
Moderator variables. Our first moderator Creditor Rights is captured by the creditor 
rights index which measures the power of secured lenders in bankruptcy (Djankov et al., 2007). 
We use Djankov et al.‘s (2007) index, which is constructed by La Porta et al. (1997), but updated 
with minor differences for a broader set of countries. The value of one is added to the index when 
a country‘s laws and regulations provide each of the following powers to secured lenders 
(Djankov et al., 2007: 302): (1) there are restrictions, such as creditor consent, when a debtor 
files for reorganization; (2) secured creditors can seize their collateral after the petition for 
reorganization is approved, that is, whether there is no automatic stay or asset freeze imposed by 
                                                          
8
 We scale cash and cash equivalents by total assets and number of employees by sales to provide theoretical and 
empirical consistency with prior work. These are also ―normal‖ denominators for cash and employees, respectively, 
as cash is obtained from the balance sheet (so scaling by total assets provides a ratio between 0 and 1) and HR slack 
relates to the inverse of productivity (i.e., sales/number of employees) (Mishina et al., 2004). 
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the court; (3) secured creditors are paid first out of the proceeds of liquidating a bankrupt firm; 
and (4) an administrator, not management, is responsible for running the business during the 
reorganization. The creditor rights index aggregates the scores on the four items and varies 
between 0 (poor creditor rights) and 4 (strong creditor rights). To test Hypothesis 2, we interact 
the creditor rights index with financial slack and financial slack squared. 
The second moderator is Employee Rights, which is captured by the employment law 
index developed by Botero et al. (2004). Employment laws regulate individual employment 
conditions, including alternatives to the standard employment contract, flexibility of working 
conditions, and termination of employment. The employment law index measures the incremental 
cost to the employer of deviating from a hypothetical rigid contract, in which the conditions of a 
job are specified and a worker cannot be fired. Thus, higher values of this index indicate more 
extensive legal protection of workers.
9
 To test Hypothesis 3, we interact the employee rights 
index with HR slack and HR slack squared. 
Control variables. We control for several variables that serve as standard controls in 
studies on the performance consequences of slack resources (e.g., George, 2005) as well as 
variables specific to our context. We first include several firm-level control variables.
10
 Because 
                                                          
9
 Both our creditor and employee rights measures are static. This is unlikely to be a cause of concern, however, as 
both creditor and labor rights have been shown to remain stable over time. Specifically, the correlation between the 
2003 and 1978 creditor rights indices is 0.95. Similarly, Capron and Guillén (2009) report a 0.95 correlation between 
their labor rights index of the early 1990s and the index of the early 2000s. Overall, previous evidence indicates that 
creditor and labor rights remain very stable over time, and we hence see no reason why the use of static measures 
would bias our results towards finding support for our hypotheses. Moreover, we use mean-centered creditor and 
employee rights to reduce multicollinearity concerns when interacting these variables with financial and HR slack, 
respectively (e.g., Neter et al., 1996). 
10
 We acknowledge that firm size might influence both firm performance and the accumulation of slack resources. 
However, note that we already control for firm size through using ratio variables as scaling controls for firm size. In 
unreported regressions, we added controls for firm size to reduce any potential remaining size effects. We control for 
firm size, measured as the natural logarithm of the total number of employees (in full-time equivalents). Following 
Kim and Bettis (2014), we use the number of employees rather than other measures, such as total assets or sales, 
because we already used total assets to scale performance (gross profit). Using total assets or sales as a proxy for 
firm size may introduce a spurious relationship between firm performance and size. We also include the natural 
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prior performance is likely to influence both the level of slack and current firm performance 
(Sharfman et al., 1988), we control for lagged performance.
11
 Moreover, given that resources are 
likely to be more critical in younger firms, we control for firm age measured as the natural 
logarithm of the number of years since formal incorporation plus one. We also control for 
potential slack, measured as the equity-to-debt ratio, adjusted by subtracting the mean ratio for all 
firms in the same 4-digit industry and country as the focal firm (Bromiley, 1991; George, 2005). 
Recoverable slack is measured as inventories and accounts receivables divided by total assets 
(Bradley et al., 2011b). This measure is again adjusted for the mean ratio for all firms in the same 
4-digit industry and country as the focal firm. For both slack measures, we further calculate the 
squared variables to capture any quadratic effects as suggested by prior theoretical and empirical 
work (Bromiley, 1991; George, 2005). 
 We also include several industry control variables. Specifically, industry profitability is 
measured as the average ROA of firms operating in the same country and industry (4-digit 
industry code) as a sample firm. Number of competitors is measured as the natural logarithm of 
the number of firms competing in the same country and industry as the sample firm. Size of 
competitors is measured as the average of the natural logarithm of the number of employees of 
firms operating in the same country and industry as the sample firm. Industry complexity is 
measured as the sum of the squared market shares of firms operating in the same country and 
sector as the focal firm. Finally, to capture any remaining heterogeneity at the industry level, we 
include industry fixed effects by using two-digit industry codes. 
                                                                                                                                                                                            
logarithm of the number of subsidiaries of a firm plus one, which also partially controls for firm size. Our results, 
however, remain virtually identical. 
11
 We also estimated models where we exclude the lagged dependent variable because the inclusion of lagged 
performance potentially raises an important caveat. Specifically, the coefficients for independent (and control) 
variables with little variation could be understated because their impact on firm performance might be captured by 
the lagged dependent variable (e.g., Schneper and Guillén, 2004). Results remain qualitatively similar. 
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 We also control for several country-level variables obtained from the World Bank. To 
avoid having our creditor (labor) protection measures capture differences in economic 
development rather than legal differences, we control for the level of economic development of a 
country—measured by the natural logarithm of GDP per capita defined as GDP divided by 
midyear population. Further, strong legal rights may be less important if enforcement of these 
laws is weak. We therefore control for the Rule of Law, which measures the legal enforcement of 
laws. It is a time-varying measure and varies between -2.5 (weak rule of law) and +2.5 (strong 
rule of law).
12
 We also include year fixed effects to account for unobservable macro-economic 
effects, general events or trends in the data. 
  
Econometric approach 
With a pooled dataset consisting of up to four years of data for each firm, we tested our 
hypotheses using Generalized Estimating Equations (GEE) which accommodates the analysis of 
panel data with repeated, within-subject measures (Ballinger, 2004). The GEE approach for 
modeling longitudinal data accounts for unobserved heterogeneity across firms and for the lack of 
independence across observations for the same firm through the specification of a working 
correlation matrix. Using the xtgee command in Stata, we chose a normal distribution and an 
identity link function that corresponded to a linear model. For the correlation matrix, we used the 
general ―unstructured‖ matrix option. The use of the unstructured correlation matrix together with 
robust variance estimators provides very conservative results (Liang and Zeger, 1986). 
                                                          
12
 We further estimated models that include country fixed effects to control for any remaining unmeasured or 
unobservable (static) differences between countries, including financial reporting requirements and cultural 
differences. In these specifications, the main effects of creditor and employee rights are omitted because these 
variables do not change within countries. However, for the purpose of our study, we are not particularly interested in 
the main effects of these variables on firm performance. Rather, we are interested in the interactions between 
financial slack (squared) and creditor rights and HR slack (squared) and employee rights. These interactions between 
time-variant slack and time-invariant national laws show how the effect of slack on firm performance varies with the 
level of creditor or employee protection (e.g., Allison, 2005). Results remain qualitatively similar. 
23 
 
 
RESULTS 
Main results 
Table 2 reports the descriptive statistics and correlations between the variables, except for 
industry, year and country dummies. Interestingly, the correlation between financial and HR 
slack is negligible. Thus, firms with financial slack do not necessarily have HR slack (and vice 
versa). Moreover, while financial slack is positively correlated with firm performance, HR slack 
is negatively correlated with firm performance.  
*** Include Table 2 about here *** 
Table 3 presents the GEE estimation results. Model 1 includes only control variables. In 
Model 2, we add the financial and HR slack measures and their quadratic terms. In Model 3, we 
interact financial slack and its squared term with creditor rights. In Model 4, we interact HR slack 
and its squared term with employee rights. Model 5 presents the full model. 
The results for the control variables provide some interesting insights. With respect to 
firm-level controls, past firm performance is positively related with current firm performance. 
When all other variables are held at their means, an increase from the mean to the mean + 1 
standard deviation (S.D.) in prior-year performance increases current firm performance by about 
73 percent for the average firm. Next, potential slack and recoverable slack positively influence 
firm performance at diminishing rates. An increase from the mean to the mean + 1 S.D. in 
potential (recoverable) slack increases firm performance by about 15 percent (29 percent) for the 
average firm. The results also suggest that the other firm-level controls play an economically 
more modest role. With respect to industry-level controls, only industry profitability has an 
economically strong and positive impact on firm performance. An increase from the mean to the 
mean + 1 S.D. in industry profitability increases firm performance by about 56 percent for the 
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average firm. Finally, the country-level control variables generally have an economically modest 
impact on firm performance: the most impactful are GDP per capita and rule of law. An increase 
from the mean to the mean + 1 S.D. in country GDP per capita (rule of law) increases firm 
performance by about 5 percent (4 percent) for the average firm. 
*** Include Table 3 about here *** 
With respect to our hypotheses, Table 3 shows that Hypothesis 1a is supported. The linear 
coefficient of financial slack is significant and positive, while the squared term is significant and 
negative in all model specifications. Thus, we find that financial slack has a positive effect on 
firm performance, but this effect gradually diminishes with increasing slack. The effect of 
financial slack on firm performance does not become negative at high levels of financial slack.
13
 
Moreover, Table 3 shows that Hypothesis 1b is not supported. The linear coefficient of HR slack 
is negative and significant, while the squared term is positive and significant in all model 
specifications. These results are opposite to our expectations. Thus, we find that HR slack has a 
negative effect on firm performance, but this effect gradually diminishes with increasing HR 
slack. The effect of HR slack on firm performance does not become positive at high levels of HR 
slack.
14
 As we demonstrate below, the strength of the effects of financial (HR) slack on firm 
performance ultimately depends on the creditor and employee rights of the country in which 
managers operate. 
 In Table 3, for all models that include the interaction terms between financial slack 
(squared) and creditor rights, we find that the linear interaction terms are negative and 
significant—the quadratic interaction terms are not significant. Consistent with Hypothesis 2 and 
                                                          
13
 Performance increases with increasing financial slack and is at its maximum when financial slack equals 
approximately 0.48, which lies outside the data range.  
14
 Performance decreases with increasing HR slack and is at its minimum when HR slack equals approximately 0.39, 
which lies outside the data range.  
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as plotted in Figure 1, this finding indicates that the relationship between financial slack and firm 
performance is less positive for firms operating in countries with stronger creditor rights relative 
to firms operating in countries with weaker creditor rights. These effects are also economically 
meaningful. When all other variables are held at their means, an increase from the mean to the 
mean +1 S.D. in financial slack increases firm performance by about 25 percent for the average 
firm located in France (a country with the weakest creditor protection rights in our sample), while 
it increases firm performance by about 14 percent in the average firm in the U.K. (a country with 
the strongest creditor protection rights in the sample).  
*** Include Figure 1 about here *** 
 Further, in Table 3, for all models that include the interaction terms between HR slack 
(squared) and employee rights, the linear interaction terms are negative and significant—the 
quadratic interaction terms are not significant. As predicted in Hypothesis 3 and as plotted in 
Figure 2, this finding suggests that the relationship between HR slack and firm performance is 
more negative for firms operating in countries with stronger labor protection laws relative to 
firms located in countries with weaker labor protection laws. These effects are again 
economically significant. When all other variables are held at their means, a decrease from the 
mean + 1 S.D. to the mean in HR slack increases firm performance by about 45 percent for the 
average firm located in Russia (a country with the strongest employee protection rights in our 
sample), while it increases firm performance by about 25 percent for the average firm in the U.K. 
(a country with the weakest employee protection rights in our sample). 
*** Include Figure 2 about here *** 
 
Robustness tests 
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We fitted several additional models to assess the strength of alternative explanations and 
demonstrate the robustness of our findings.
15
 
First, we test for the possibility that slack resources might take more time to be 
―unlocked‖ by managers than one year and hence that the relationship between financial (HR) 
slack and performance might change when we account for this possibility. To do so, we employ 
increasingly longer time lags between financial (HR) slack and firm performance, including 2-
year, 3-year and 4-year time lags. Results remain similar. Specifically, when considering the 
relationship between financial (HR) slack and firm performance, relationships remain 
qualitatively similar with what we reported before using 1-year time lags.  
Second, to control for the possibility that slack resources might be endogenously 
determined (e.g., Wang et al., 2016), we apply a ―predicted value approach‖. This helps to partial 
out the endogenously determined variance of the level of financial and HR slack. For financial 
slack, this approach entails that we first run regressions predicting the ‗normal‘ level of cash 
(scaled by total assets) by regressing cash scaled by total assets on basic firm, industry and 
country variables and saving the predicted values. Subsequently, we subtract the ‗normal‘ cash to 
total assets ratio (based on our regression) from the firm‘s actual cash to total assets ratio to 
obtain financial slack. We follow a similar procedure for HR slack. When using these alternative 
measures, the results remain similar. 
Third, we use alternative measures for creditor and employee rights. For creditor rights, 
we use the World Bank‘s time-varying strength of legal rights index that measures the degree to 
which laws protect the rights of borrowers and lenders and thus facilitate lending. The index 
ranges from 0 to 10, with higher scores indicating that these laws are better designed to expand 
                                                          
15
 These models are not reported in detail due to space considerations, but they are available from the authors upon 
request. 
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access to credit. Results remain similar. We prefer the use of the creditor rights index developed 
by Djankov et al. (2007) as our primary measure, however, because this measure better reflects 
the theoretical construct ―creditor protection‖, whereas the World Bank measure also 
incorporates the protection of borrowers. We also use the collective relations laws index as an 
alternative employee rights index, which captures the balance of power between labor unions and 
employers and associations of employers (Botero et al., 2004). Higher values of this index 
correspond with more extensive legal protection of workers. Results again remain similar. 
 
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION 
The relationship between a firm‘s slack resources and its financial performance has received 
considerable research attention, generating conflicting findings. Using a large-scale, cross-
national dataset of privately held European firms, this study re-examines prior research on the 
slack-performance relationship and develops a new integrated behavioral-institutional perspective 
on how formal regulative institutions influence the performance effects of slack resources. 
 
The relationship between slack resources and firm performance 
In the behavioral perspective, slack performs a positive stabilizing and adaptive role (Cyert and 
March, 1963; Thompson, 1967). Thus, ―slack, despite its costs, has a positive impact on firm 
performance‖ (Tan and Peng, 2003: 1249); that is, it is not until the level of slack becomes 
excessive that it may lower firm performance (Bourgeois, 1981; Sharfman et al., 1988). This 
implies that firms need to reach a desirable or optimal level of slack to achieve high financial 
performance (Bromiley, 2005).  
Consistent with Tan and Peng (2003), our results suggest that the behavioral perspective 
works particularly well when slack is unabsorbed (i.e., financial slack). Despite similarities with 
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Tan and Peng (2003), however, we do not find evidence for an inverted U-shaped relationship 
between financial slack and firm performance. Even though the relationship between financial 
slack and firm performance takes the form of a quadratic function (with a positive linear term and 
a negative squared term), the inflection point lies outside the valid range of the data. This finding 
indicates that the impact of financial slack is positive over the entire range of the data, though this 
positive effect diminishes as financial slack increases. Our results are similar to those of Kim and 
Bettis (2014)—who focus on a large-scale sample of publicly held US firms—and show that 
returns to cash continue to increase far beyond transactional needs. 
Conversely, our main results also suggest that the behavioral perspective overvalues the 
benefits (relative to the costs) of holding absorbed slack (i.e., HR slack). Specifically, we find 
that the impact of HR slack on firm performance is negative over the entire range of the data, 
though this negative effect diminishes as HR slack increases. One explanation for this finding 
could be that it might simply take more time for the positive effects of HR slack to arise. 
However, robustness checks using longer time lags also show negative results for the effect of 
HR slack on firm performance—making this unlikely to be an explanation for our findings. Our 
findings for HR slack do align with recent research taking a knowledge-based perspective, 
indicating that HR slack in general (with the exception of tacit and specific HR slack) decreases 
firm performance (e.g., Lecuona and Reitzig, 2014). Building in a buffer of human resources that 
is perfectly tailored to a firm‘s future challenges or opportunities is extremely hard to do. More 
often than not, firms build in a buffer of general human resources consistent with the capabilities 
they required in the past or to date—not necessarily intentionally as it is difficult to predict what 
the future will bring. However, with that kind of a general buffer of human resources, it also may 
be significantly harder to truly reap the benefits of having that HR slack in place as there is less 
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likely a fit between the human resources firms need to address future challenges or opportunities 
and the human resources they actually have available. 
 
The moderating effect of regulative institutions 
We further study how the performance effects of slack resources depend on the nature of 
regulatory macro institutions. Specifically, we theorized on the moderating impact of creditor and 
employee protection laws on the performance effects of financial and HR slack, respectively.  
To date, scholars have largely attributed the positive effect of financial slack on firm 
performance to its adaptive role, stimulating innovation and experimentation (Bromiley, 1991) 
and the fact that it also serves as a buffer when firms are confronted with a lack of financial 
resources in their external environment (O‘Brien, 2003). Past research, however, has not 
examined how national systems of corporate governance and, more specifically, creditor rights 
affect the performance effects of financial slack. Nevertheless, stronger national creditor and 
bankruptcy rights can severely constrain managers‘ willingness to take risks and experiment 
(Seifert and Gonenc, 2012) and can ease access to (cheaper) external debt financing (Djankov et 
al., 2007). These factors are likely to make financial slack less valuable for firm performance in 
countries with stronger creditor rights. We indeed find that, in countries with stronger creditor 
rights, financial slack is less positively related to firm performance.  
Prior research has further argued that ―sticky‖ HR slack might be associated with lower 
firm performance because of reduced exploration into new areas that require different human 
resource skills, knowledge and abilities (Mishina et al., 2004) and the high cost of retaining such 
slack (Lecuona and Reitzig, 2014). Still, past studies have not examined how national labor 
protection laws might influence the performance effects of HR slack, though they have suggested 
that stronger labor protection laws might increase the ―stickiness‖ and cost of human resources 
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(Botero et al., 2004). Our results show that in countries with stronger employee protection laws, 
which usually increase the ―stickiness‖ and raise the costs of HR slack, HR slack is more 
negatively related to firm performance. These results underscore the need to consider a firm‘s 
national legal context when analyzing the relationship between its slack resources and 
performance. 
 
Theoretical integration 
The results provide a foundation for integrating behavioral and institutional perspectives in the 
study of the slack resources-firm performance relationship. One of the key aspirations of the 
behavioral theory of the firm was to offer ―a set of summary concepts and relations that could be 
used to understand the behavior of a variety of organizations in a variety of decision situations‖ 
(Cyert and March, 1963: 2, emphasis added). However, several aspects of the interplay between 
organizations and their environment remain under examined (Gavetti et al., 2012). 
Prior theorizing almost exclusively focused on the impact of the level of slack resources 
on firm performance in an institutional vacuum. Simply possessing slack resources, however, is 
not sufficient for firms to generate performance advantages (Priem and Butler, 2001; Sirmon et 
al., 2007). These resources need to be transformed into performance advantages through 
managerial action (Sirmon et al., 2007), where managerial discretion is influenced by national 
legal systems (Crossland and Hambrick, 2007). Scholars have noted that effective deployment of 
firms‘ resources is conditioned by contextual factors (Priem and Butler, 2001) such as corporate 
governance systems and the market for managerial talent. Yet, past research has tended to equate 
a firm‘s external environment with its industry environment, largely ignoring the higher level of 
national institutions (see Capron and Guillén, 2009; Crossland and Hambrick, 2007, for notable 
exceptions). Our results indicate that these institutions exert a significant moderating effect on the 
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slack-firm performance relationship, especially among the privately held firms we examined in 
this study. 
The use of institutional theory helps in explaining the forces that influence firm 
performance apart from the level of slack resources. By arguing and showing that the value of 
different types of slack resources depends on the institutional context, our study helps to clarify 
when the different types of slack resources promote firm performance and when they constrain 
firm performance. This brings greater clarity to the (conflicting) findings reported in previous 
research, which has focused on samples from countries characterized by different regulatory 
institutions. We have shown that similar increments in slack resources may have stronger or 
weaker influences on firm performance in different countries. Future studies would benefit from 
the insights of institutional theory because national institutions influence managers‘ discretion to 
employ their slack resources, which ultimately influences the allocation and performance 
consequences of these resources.  
 
Future research directions 
Our results suggest several useful directions for future study. Researchers need to consider other 
types of slack resources and how they may influence firm performance. This would allow a richer 
understanding of the role of these different resources and their interrelatedness in determining 
firm performance. For example, an important issue to explore in future research is the nature, 
measurement and effect of HR slack. The nature of this slack type may be contingent on the size 
of the organization and its main economic activity. Therefore, researchers may need to explore 
other measures to capture this type of slack. Further, the effect of HR slack on other firm 
performance measures needs to be explored; in particular, it would be useful to investigate how 
this type of slack affects organizational survival among smaller, younger private firms—many of 
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which work hard to stay alive. While our study shows that HR slack is detrimental to financial 
performance, the same may not necessarily be true for survival.  
Moreover, there are multiple other institutions that influence managers‘ discretion in 
resource allocation and use. These institutions should be examined to determine their potential 
effect on the slack-performance relationship. Some of these institutions have a strong overt effect 
(e.g., legal); others (e.g., cultural norms) may have a more subtle, yet crucial impact. It would be 
prudent, therefore, to consider a mix of these institutions to understand their influence on 
managers‘ discretion because managers frequently have to deal with many of these institutions at 
the same time. The powers of these institutions change with shifts in economic and technological 
forces in an industry or a country. Therefore, it is important to consider the implications of these 
forces when analyzing the slack–firm performance relationship. 
Even though we focused on privately held firms in this study, our findings on how 
national laws influence the slack-performance relationship might also apply in public firms. 
Public firms are well known for their more dispersed ownership and have been fertile grounds for 
studying slack and its effects on firm performance (e.g., Bromiley, 1991). Privately held firms are 
the dominant type of firms around the world, have more concentrated ownership, and are more 
constrained in their access to financial and labor markets. Consequently, there is a need for more 
research that gives attention to private firms. It is possible that national governance, ownership 
and firm governance systems interact to influence the accumulation and deployment of different 
types of slack resources or moderate the effect of these resources on firm performance. 
 One of our study‘s key contributions is offering a solid empirical basis to integrate 
behavioral and institutional views on the slack-firm performance relationship. This should help us 
in accumulating research findings and explaining their implications for managerial action. Given 
that institutions vary across countries, especially corporate governance systems, special attention 
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should be given in future research to cross-national comparisons, accounting for the unique 
settings in which managers make their strategic decisions. 
  
Practical implications 
Our findings have important implications for managers and policy-makers. Policy-makers 
generally view behaviors where managers accumulate significant amounts of financial slack and 
minimize HR slack as undesirable. Rather, policy-makers generally push managers to minimize 
financial slack, using excess cash to conduct investments and increase employment levels, 
potentially creating HR slack. However, our results suggest that such actions can significantly 
hamper firm performance. Moreover, these negative effects are particularly strong for firms that 
operate in countries that better protect financiers (i.e., creditors) and employees from possible 
exploitative managerial behavior. Our findings suggest an important trade-off where the actions 
taken by governments to increase economic activities and firm employment and the stronger 
protection of stakeholders may significantly weaken the competitive advantage of firms. 
 Our results further suggest that ―lean‖ organizations do not necessarily perform better 
than organizations with some ―fat‖ or vice versa. Managers should actively manage the diverse 
pool of resources in an organization that is in excess of the minimum necessary to sustain routine 
operations. Our evidence suggests that financial slack is valuable, and particularly for firms 
operating in countries with weaker creditor rights. Still, HR slack is detrimental for firm 
performance, and particularly for firms operating in countries with stronger labor protection laws. 
Overall, the management of these slack resources critically depends on their characteristics and 
the institutional environment in which managers operate.  
 
Conclusion 
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The study of the relationship between slack resources and firm performance has received 
considerable attention in the literature. The diversity of theoretical perspectives and samples, 
while ignoring the institutional context, has resulted in a fragmented and contradictory body of 
research. In this study, we have tested an integrated behavioral-institutional perspective and 
proposed that legal institutions moderate the slack-performance relationship. Using a large 
sample of private firms from 26 European countries, we find support for our key proposition. 
Results show the importance of incorporating measures of the institutional environment in future 
studies examining the effect of slack on firm performance. 
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AUSTRIA 206 733 0.12 38 140 13,410 15,792 3 7.00 0.5007 0.3601
BELGIUM 5,211 20,195 3.34 56 58 17,867 10,540 2 6.00 0.5133 0.4226
BULGARIA 1,869 7,167 1.19 53 92 3,847 3,127 2 9.00 0.5189 0.4435
CROATIA 2,965 11,414 1.89 55 55 4,157 3,628 3 6.40 0.4879 0.4524
CZECH REPUBL. 5,357 20,594 3.41 54 75 6,204 3,560 3 6.60 0.5205 0.3393
FINLAND 2,202 8,307 1.37 52 52 10,025 5,549 1 8.00 0.7366 0.3185
FRANCE 3,920 15,147 2.51 54 42 7,299 3,955 0 6.20 0.7443 0.6667
GERMANY 3,778 14,203 2.35 55 208 56,058 31,462 3 7.60 0.7015 0.6071
GREECE 3,654 14,385 2.38 53 40 5,860 6,929 1 4.00 0.5189 0.4851
HUNGARY 493 1,564 0.26 45 120 13,030 8,077 1 7.00 0.3773 0.6071
IRELAND 34 119 0.02 20 138 38,495 28,491 1 9.00 0.3427 0.4643
ITALY 19,732 77,902 12.89 55 56 14,683 13,295 2 3.00 0.6499 0.6310
LATVIA 862 3,363 0.56 47 94 7,144 3,843 3 10.00 0.7211 0.5327
LITHUANIA 1,151 4,332 0.72 51 88 5,896 3,643 2 5.00 0.6233 0.4970
NETHERLANDS 144 513 0.08 36 109 39,430 27,364 3 6.00 0.7256 0.4643
POLAND 6,279 22,406 3.71 54 100 9,237 5,277 1 8.20 0.6395 0.5655
PORTUGAL 667 2,614 0.43 48 81 11,855 10,953 1 3.00 0.8088 0.6488
ROMANIA 9,044 33,912 5.61 56 51 1,834 1,181 2 8.60 0.3273 0.5565
RUSSIA 35,447 126,837 20.98 56 70 2,036 895 2 3.00 0.8276 0.5774
SLOVAKIA 1,124 4,128 0.68 52 75 5,868 3,685 2 8.00 0.6571 0.4524
SLOVENIA 53 182 0.03 22 70 6,286 5,146 3 4.59 0.7359 0.4851
SPAIN 28,465 107,751 17.83 56 43 5,997 5,041 3 6.00 0.7447 0.5863
SWEDEN 3,343 12,682 2.10 56 80 21,822 10,810 1 7.20 0.7405 0.5387
SWITZERLAND 77 295 0.05 18 187 23,635 43,485 1 8.00 0.4520 0.4167
UKRAINE 13,685 48,624 8.04 55 68 1,138 680 2 9.00 0.6609 0.5774
UK 12,871 45,093 7.46 56 127 24,556 16,388 4 10.00 0.2824 0.1875
TOTAL SAMPLE 162,633 604,462 100.00 56 63 6,337 4,405 2.00 6.78 0.60 0.50
Table 1:  Sample summary statistics by country 
 
Note. Employees is in full time equivalents. Sales and assets are in thousands of Euros. The creditor rights index is from Djankov et al. (2007), the strength of legal rights index 
comes from the World Bank, the employment law index comes from Botero et al. (2004) and the collective relations law index also comes from Botero et al. (2004). 
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Table 2:  Descriptive statistics and correlations 
Mean S.D. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16
1 GDP per capita 
L
9.93 0.83 1.00
2 Rule of law 0.91 0.80 0.88 1.00
3 Creditor rights index 2.00 0.96 -0.06 -0.05 1.00
4 Strength of legal rights index 6.78 2.07 -0.12 0.14 0.14 1.00
5 Employment law index 0.60 0.15 -0.03 -0.08 -0.11 -0.45 1.00
6 Collective relations laws index 0.50 0.11 -0.26 -0.34 -0.43 -0.39 0.48 1.00
7 Firm performance 0.07 0.13 -0.07 -0.09 -0.04 -0.04 0.04 -0.02 1.00
8 Firm age 
L
2.76 0.69 0.44 0.42 0.06 0.06 -0.14 -0.08 -0.08 1.00
9 Intangible assets ratio 0.02 0.07 0.19 0.18 0.07 0.04 -0.04 -0.03 -0.07 -0.01 1.00
10 Potential slack -0.06 2.46 0.02 0.03 0.01 0.02 -0.02 -0.01 0.15 0.08 -0.02 1.00
11 Recoverable financial slack 0.00 0.26 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 -0.01 -0.01 0.32 0.07 -0.12 0.41 1.00
12 Industry profitability 0.07 0.05 -0.22 -0.29 -0.15 -0.17 0.16 0.04 0.37 -0.23 -0.07 -0.02 -0.01 1.00
13 Number of competitors 
L
4.48 1.54 -0.14 -0.29 0.16 -0.24 0.24 0.15 0.02 -0.15 -0.03 -0.01 0.00 0.06 1.00
14 Size of competitors 
L
4.38 0.51 -0.03 0.06 0.17 0.23 -0.21 -0.35 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 -0.21 1.00
15 Industry complexity 0.13 0.17 0.03 0.12 -0.11 0.12 -0.09 -0.11 0.01 0.03 0.02 0.00 0.00 0.00 -0.61 0.23 1.00
16 Financial (available) slack 0.00 0.11 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 -0.01 -0.01 0.21 0.01 -0.07 0.15 0.30 -0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00
17 HR slack 0.00 0.05 0.03 0.03 0.01 0.00 -0.01 -0.01 -0.13 0.03 0.00 0.07 -0.04 0.00 -0.01 0.00 0.00 -0.02
Panel A: Country-level
Panel B:  Firm-level 
 
Note. Country-level correlations are based on 104 country-year observations, firm-level correlations are based on 604,462 firm-year observations. 
L
 indicates the natural logarithm 
of a variable is used. 
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Table 3:  GEE regressions of slack as a predictor of firm performance
Variables Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5
Lagged performance 0.427*** 0.375*** 0.375*** 0.376*** 0.375***
[0.002] [0.002] [0.002] [0.002] [0.002]
Firm age -0.003*** -0.002*** -0.002*** -0.002*** -0.002***
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000]
Intangible assets ratio -0.015*** -0.011*** -0.011*** -0.011*** -0.011***
[0.002] [0.002] [0.002] [0.002] [0.002]
Potential slack 0.003*** 0.004*** 0.004*** 0.004*** 0.004***
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000]
Potential slack squared -0.000*** -0.000*** -0.000*** -0.000*** -0.000***
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000]
Recoverable slack 0.089*** 0.079*** 0.079*** 0.079*** 0.079***
[0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0.001]
Recoverable slack squared -0.025*** -0.028*** -0.028*** -0.028*** -0.028***
[0.002] [0.002] [0.002] [0.002] [0.002]
Industry profitability 0.626*** 0.687*** 0.687*** 0.686*** 0.687***
[0.004] [0.004] [0.004] [0.004] [0.004]
Number of competitors 0.000** 0.000* 0.000* 0.000* 0.000*
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000]
Size of competitors 0.004*** 0.004*** 0.004*** 0.004*** 0.004***
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000]
Industry complexity 0.000 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001
[0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0.001]
GDP per capita 0.002*** 0.004*** 0.004*** 0.004*** 0.004***
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000]
Rule of law 0.002*** 0.003*** 0.003*** 0.003*** 0.003***
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000]
Creditor rights 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000]
Employee rights -0.004*** -0.007*** -0.007*** -0.008*** -0.008***
[0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0.001]  
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Financial slack — 0.126*** 0.126*** 0.126*** 0.126***
[0.002] [0.002] [0.002] [0.002]
Financial slack squared — -0.131*** -0.129*** -0.131*** -0.129***
[0.007] [0.007] [0.007] [0.007]
HR slack — -0.402*** -0.402*** -0.392*** -0.392***
[0.006] [0.006] [0.007] [0.007]
HR slack squared — 0.509*** 0.509*** 0.508*** 0.508***
[0.016] [0.016] [0.021] [0.021]
Financial slack * Creditor rights — — -0.018*** — -0.018***
[0.002] [0.002]
Financial slack squared * Creditor rights — — 0.013 — 0.013
[0.007] [0.007]
HR slack * Employee rights — — — -0.215*** -0.213***
[0.044] [0.044]
HR slack squared * Employee rights — — — 0.240 0.237
[0.134] [0.135]
Constant -0.033*** -0.054*** -0.053*** -0.052*** -0.052***
[0.004] [0.004] [0.004] [0.004] [0.004]
Industry F.E. Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year F.E. Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Number of firm year obs. 604,462 604,462 604,462 604,462 604,462
Number of firms 162,633 162,633 162,633 162,633 162,633
Chi-squared 209,918*** 210,755*** 210,889*** 211,388*** 211,518***
 
Note. Unstandardized regression coefficients from GEE models with semi robust standard errors reported in brackets. *** p < 0.001, ** p < 0.01 and  
* p < 0.05 (conservative two-tailed tests). 
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Figure 1:  Moderating effects of creditor rights on the relationship between financial 
slack and firm performance
Strong creditor rights (80th percentile) Weak creditor rights (20th percentile)
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Figure 2:  Moderating effects of employee rights on the relationship between HR 
slack and firm performance
Strong employee rights (80th percentile) Weak employee rights (20th percentile)
